2012年4月22日 星期日

壹2

信仰中的情感
第一部2(1.6.1)

12(1.6.1.1)
可能有人會問,心m中的情感是什麽?
我的回答是:情感不是別的,乃是心靈s的喜好ic和意志,以更強有力、更可察覺的方式運行ex。
I. It may be inquired what the affections of the mind are?
I answer, The affections are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul.

13
神賦予心靈s兩種功能。一種是心靈s可以藉此察覺pc和審視sp的功能,或藉此辨別、觀看、評斷事物。這種功能稱為悟性。另一種是心靈s藉此不只察覺pc並觀看事物,而且在某種意義上還傾向於它所觀看或思考的事物;或正面的傾向,或反面的傾向,即厭惡。或是換一種說法,心靈s藉此並非以漠不關心、無動於衷的旁觀者的態度觀看事物,而是或喜歡或不喜歡,或滿意或不滿意,17或同意或拒絕。這種功能有各種名稱,有時稱為喜好ic,當這與它所決定所管制的行動有關時,則稱為意志。而與這功能之運作有關的心智m常稱為心h。
God has endued the soul with two faculties: one is that by which it is capable of perception and speculation, or by which it discerns and views and judges of things, which is called the understanding. The other faculty is that by which the soul does not merely perceive and view things, but is some way inclined with respect to the things it views or considers; either is inclined to them, or is disinclined and averse from them; or is the faculty, by which the soul does not behold things as an indifferent, unaffected spectator, but either as liking or disliking, pleased or displeased, 17 approving or rejecting. This faculty is called by various names: it is sometimes called the inclination; and, as it has respect to the actions that are determined and governed by it, is called the will; and the mind, with regard to the exercises of this faculty, is often called the heart.

14
這功能有兩種運作ex方式,一種是使心s朝向它所注意到的事物移動,即贊成這事、喜悅這事、傾向於這事;另一種是使心s反對它所注意到的事物,即不贊成這事、不滿意這事、遠離這事、否定這事。
The exercises exercise exercises of this faculty are of two sorts; either those by which the soul is carried out towards the things that are in view, in approving of them, being pleased with them, and inclined to them; or those in which the soul opposes the things that are in view, in disapproving of them, and in being displeased with them, averse from them, and rejecting them.

15(1.6.1.2)
正如心s的喜好ic與意志之活動ex其種類各有不同;照樣,其程度更是各有不同。有時心s的喜悅或不喜悅、愛好ic或不愛好ic只是略略發動,這時心靈s的狀態也只是稍稍移動,略略離開全然無動於衷的狀態。有時則比這更多,認同或嫌惡,喜悅或排斥,都更強烈;我們在其中也會愈來愈激昂,直到我們心靈s開始強烈活動到可察覺的程度,心靈s表現的強烈程度到了一個地步,(因著身心s關連的自然律lu,即造物主使人之身體與心靈s緊密結合的定律),血液與行動之氣a-s  開始有可察覺的改變,常常因而產生某種身體的感覺,特別是與心臟和生命所繫之器官  有關的部份,這心臟和生命所繫之器官又是體液f-o-b  的源頭,經過這樣的步驟,便使得心智m就這功能的運作e而言稱為心h,這可能在所有文化與年代都是如此。同時也該留意,我們所稱的情感af,就是這功能fc更強有力、更可察覺的運作e。
And as the exercises of the inclination and will of the soul are various in their kinds, so they are much more various in their degrees. There are some exercises of pleasedness or displeasedness, inclination or disinclination, wherein the soul is carried but a little beyond a the a state of perfect perfect indifference. And there are other degrees above this, wherein the approbation or dislike, pleasedness or aversion, are stronger; wherein we may rise higher and higher, till the soul comes to act vigorously and sensibly, and the actings of the soul are with that strength, that (through the laws of the union which the Creator has fixed between the soul and the body) the motion of the blood and animal spirits begins to be sensibly altered; whence oftentimes arises some bodily sensation, especially about the heart and vitals, that are the fountain of the fluids of the body: from whence it comes to pass, that the mind, with regard to the exercises of this faculty, perhaps in all nations and ages, is called the heart. And it is to be noted that they are these more vigorous and sensible exercises of this faculty that are called the affections.

16
心靈s的意志與情感並不是兩種不同的功能fc;情感與意志基本上並不是涇渭分明、毫無交集的兩個東西;心靈s的意志和喜好ic的單純活動act與情感也沒有什麼不同,這三者的差別只在於其運作ex的活力大小和被察覺的程度。
The will and the affections of the soul are not two faculties; the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of exercise.

17(1.6.1.3)
我們必須承認,這裡的語言有點不完全,其中有些字詞的意思相當是鬆散而不確定;通常總有一些慣例會規範語言的用法,但這裡有些字詞的用法並未嚴格受這規範約束。18就某些意義而言,心靈s的情感和意志與喜好ic根本沒有差別,而意志的任何運作e也決不會超過它所受的感動af;當意志要從原本完全漠不關心的狀態出來時,其活動mv不會越過它所受或正向或反向的影響a,其表現ac也不會比這更多。
It must be confessed, that language is here somewhat imperfect, and the meaning of words in a considerable measure loose and unfixed, and not precisely limited by custom, which governs 18 the use of language. In some sense, the affection of the soul differs nothing at all from the will and inclination, and the will never is in any exercise, any further than it is affected; it is not moved out of a state of perfect indifference, any otherwise than as as it is affected one way or other, and acts nothing any further.

17a
但意志與喜好ic也有許多表現ac並不是這麼普遍地稱為情感。在我們所做的每一件出於自願的事中,都有意志與喜好ic在其中運作ex,管制我們行動的,乃是我們的喜好ic。但我們一切日常生活的行為acn中,所有喜好ic和意志的表現ac通常並不是稱為情感;但一般所稱的情感與它們並無基本的不同,只是在運作e時有程度與方式上的差別。意志的一切表現act無論為何,心靈s對它眼界內的事物或喜歡或討厭,或傾向或排斥,這都與愛或恨的情感並無實質的不同:心靈s對一件事物的喜歡或愛好ic的程度如果很高,且有活力,充滿生氣,這就與“愛”這個情感是同一回事:如果討厭和排斥的程度更強烈,就與“恨”這個情感是同一回事。意志對不在眼界範圍內事物的一切正向表現act,會使心靈s對那事物有某種程度的喜好ic;當這喜好ic大到相當的程度時,這喜好ic便與“渴望”這個情感是同一回事。而當心靈s認可一個眼界範圍內的事物時,意志任何程度的表現act都有某種程度的喜好ic,當這喜好ic大到相當的程度時,這喜好ic便與“喜樂”或“喜悅”這個情感是同一回事。而如果意志不認可一個眼界範圍內的事物時,心靈s某種程度而言是不喜悅的,當這不喜悅很大時,這不喜悅便與“憂愁”或“哀傷”這個情感是同一回事。
But yet there are many actings of the will and inclination, that are not so commonly called affections. In every thing we do, wherein we act voluntarily, there is an exercise of the will and inclination. It is our inclination that governs us in our actions: but all the actings of the inclination and will, in all our common actions of life, are not ordinarily called affections. Yet, what are commonly called affections are not essentially different from them, but only in the degree and manner of exercise. In every act of the will, whatsoever, the soul either likes or dislikes, is either inclined or disinclined to what is in view: these are not essentially different from those affections of love and hatred, : : that liking or inclination of the soul to a thing; , , if it be in a high degree, and be vigorous and lively, is the very same thing with the affection of love: and that disliking and disinclining, if in a greater degree, is the very same with hatred. In every act of the will for, or towards something not present, the soul is in some degree inclined to that thing; and that inclination, if in a considerable degree, is the very same with the affection of desire. And in every degree of the act of the will, wherein the soul approves of something present, there is a degree of pleasedness; and that pleasedness, if it be in a considerable degree, is the very same with the affection affections of joy or delight. And if the will disapproves of what is present, the soul is in some degree displeased, and if that displeasedness be great, it is the very same with the affection of grief or sorrow.

18(1.6.1.4)
我們的天性n,或說明確一點,我們身心s關連的自然律lusb似乎強烈到一個地步,無論在哪種情況下,若是身體沒有產生一些影響eff,沒有使體液f-o-b─特別是行動之氣a-s的流動產生一些改變,那麼心靈s的意志或喜好ic即使發動ex了,也決不會帶著生氣與活力。而另一方面,同樣是因著這個身心s關連的自然律lusb19,身體的構造與體液f-o-b的流動也可以助長情感的展現ex。不過情感正常的居所並不在身體,而只是在心靈s。人的身體真正接受愛與恨、喜樂或憂傷、恐懼或盼望的能力,並不會比樹木的軀幹接受這些的能力更多,也不會比這人同樣這身體思考或理解的能力更多;正如只有心靈s能認知id,照樣只有心靈s會因其認知id而滿意或不滿意;正如只有心靈s能思考,照樣只有心靈s會因它所想到的事物喜愛或恨惡,歡樂或憂傷。雖然這行動之氣a-s和體液f-o-b的流動在今生總會伴隨喜愛或恨惡,歡樂或憂傷,但它們不是任何特別專屬於情感本性的東西;它們與情感本身完全是涇渭分明、沒有交集的兩回事,也絕非情感的基本要素;所以靈魂sp即使沒有依附於身體,照樣能夠愛和恨、喜樂或憂愁、盼望或恐懼、或表現其它的情感,和有依附於身體的靈魂sp一樣。
Such seems to be our nature, and such the laws of the union,     of soul and body, that there never is, in any case whatsoever, any lively and vigorous exercise of the will or inclination of the soul, without some effect upon the body, in some alteration of the motion of its fluids, and especially of the animal spirits. And, on the other hand, from the same laws of the union of the soul and 19 body; the constitution of the body and the motion of the its its fluids may promote the exercise of the affections. But yet, it is not the body, but the mind only that is the proper seat of the affections. The body of man is no more capable of being really the subject of love or hatred, joy or sorrow, fear or hope, than the body of a tree, or than the same body of man is capable of thinking and understanding. As it is the soul only that has ideas, so it is the soul only that is pleased or displeased with its ideas. As it is the soul only that thinks; so it is the soul only that loves or hates, rejoices or is grieved at what it thinks of. Nor are these motions of the animal spirits and fluids of the body any thing properly belonging to the nature of the affections, though they always accompany them in the present state; but are only effects or concomitants of the affections, that are entirely distinct from the affections themselves, and no way essential to them; so that an unbodied spirit may be as capable of love and hatred, joy or sorrow, hope or fear, or other affections, as one that is united to a body.

19
情感af和激情pas常被說成是同一件事,但某方面來說,它們在較一般的語言用法上是有差異的。情感af就其通常的意義上,似乎是個比激情pas更廣泛的詞語,情感af用以指意志或喜好ic一切有生氣有活力的行動act。激情pas則是指意志或喜好ic更突如其來的行動act,而它對行動之氣a-s產生的果效更為激烈,讓心智m更無法招架,更無法自主。
The affections and passions are frequently spoken of as the same; and yet, in the more common use of speech, there is in some respect a difference; and affection is a word, that in its ordinary signification, seems to be something more extensive than passion, being used for all vigorous lively actings of the will or inclination; but passion for those that are more sudden, and whose effects on the animal spirits are more violent, and the mind more overpowered, and less in its own command.

20(1.6.1.5)
正如意志與喜好ic的一切運作ex不是認可與喜歡,就是反對與拒絕;照樣,情感也可分成兩種;一種是帶動心靈s朝向它眼界內的東西,親近或追尋這東西;另一種是使心靈s逃避並反對這東西。
As all the exercises of the inclination and will are either in approving and liking, or disapproving and rejecting; so the affections are of two sorts; they are those by which the soul is carried out to what is in view, cleaving to it or seeking it; or those by which it is averse from it, and opposes it.

21
前者有愛、渴慕、盼望、喜樂、感激與滿足。後者有仇恨、恐懼、憤怒、憂傷等;這些現在還不須詳列說明。
Of the former sort are love, desire, hope, joy, gratitude, complacence. Of the latter kind, are hatred, fear, anger, grief and such like; which, it is needless now to stand particularly to define.

22
有些情感是意志前述幾種表現的組合,例如在20憐憫這個情感裡,有些成份是前者(愛、渴慕、盼望、喜樂、感激、滿足),針對受苦的人,有些成份是後者(恨、恐懼、憤怒、憂傷),針對他所受的苦。狂熱也是如此,狂熱這情感包含對某人或某事的高度讚許,同時也包含著對與此相反之人或事的強力反對。
And there are some affections wherein there is a composition of each of the aforementioned kinds of actings of the will; as in 20 the affection of pity, there is something of the former kind towards the person suffering, and something of the latter towards what he suffers. And so in zeal, there is in it a high approbation of some person or thing, together with a vigorous opposition to what is conceived to be contrary to it.

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